


Making total defence real—Ready by 2030

Business Forum briefing on the 2026–2030 implementation
plan

**National government · municipalities · business · civil society ·
households**



**ONE COUNTRY
ONE OPERATING SYSTEM**



CENTRE FOR THE STUDY OF
NEW GENERATION WARFARE

A three-stage stress test revealed four system-wide gaps

Lithuania is committed—but the exercise found no integrated, financed and tested system linking actors from warning through prolonged crisis.

01 WARNING & INFLUENCE

Early warning, public confidence and hostile influence activity

02 BELOW THRESHOLD

Sabotage, disinformation and threats to critical infrastructure

03 PROLONGED CRISIS

Mobilisation, displaced people, essential services and delayed reinforcement

SYSTEM-WIDE FINDINGS

01 Authority is unclear

National–municipal decision rights are not pre-agreed; early hours are spent negotiating rather than responding.

02 Legal readiness lags escalation

Grey-zone activity can outrun available authorities, with no agreed thresholds for shifting emergency regimes.

03 Guidance is not becoming readiness

Households lack clear supply guidance; shortages follow when concern rises.

04 Readiness must be tested as one system

Separate checks miss linked gaps in legal powers, scarce resources, communications and municipal action.

The ambition exists. The operating system does not—yet

Lithuania has the institutions, legal instruments, civic organisations and sector capabilities to build total defence.

The gap is integration: common authority, activation logic, resource choices, public instructions and a way to prove readiness.

The plan turns fragmented preparedness into one financed, governed and tested programme.

8

CAPABILITY AREAS

51

PORTFOLIO ACTIONS

6

ENABLING ACTIONS


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DELIVERY PHASES

Complex inside. Clear to the public.

Total defence means every part of Lithuania can act under pressure

Total defence must deter attack by making aggression too costly, keep society united under coercion, sustain resistance until allied reinforcement arrives, and preserve the capacity to resist under occupation. Each job requires a different mix of capabilities, resources and investment.



A crisis should raise the level of activity—not force leaders and citizens to invent relationships.

Every level has a clear role—and a visible obligation

NATIONAL GOVERNMENT	MUNICIPALITIES	BUSINESS	CIVIL SOCIETY	HOUSEHOLDS
Set authority, owners, standards, funding and trusted national direction.	Own warning, shelters, evacuation, at-risk populations and local leader networks.	Maintain essential functions, protect critical workers and reveal dependencies.	Register capability, train, accept tasking and exercise with municipalities.	Keep a 72-hour kit; know the warning channel, assembly point and crisis role.

The system becomes credible when responsibilities are understandable, resourced and practised.

Total defence is a public purpose—not a defence-ministry programme.

Seven priorities must turn national commitment into total-defence readiness

The implementation plan defines 51 actions; leadership must align them behind these seven national priorities.

01 MOBILISE THE WILL TO DEFEND

Use universal conscription to build participation, shared duty and national resolve.

02 ESTABLISH ONE ACCOUNTABLE CENTRE

Give one national institution ownership of preparedness, roles and coordination channels.

03 BUILD PSYCHOLOGICAL RESILIENCE

Create an empowered organizational capability to coordinate resistance to coercion and information pressure.

04 FUND PREPAREDNESS

Create a dedicated resilience or total-defence funding programme.

05 CONNECT NATIONAL LEADERSHIP

Use defence courses and a permanent network to link leaders and institutions.

06 INTEGRATE THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK

Put one practical crisis and wartime legal framework in place by 2027.

07 EMBED BUSINESS IN THE PLAN

Integrate companies into preparedness, continuity, supply and stockpile arrangements.

One programme. Seven priorities. Clear national ownership.

Launch as one funded national programme

- 01 AUTHORISE** Approve the operating architecture, accountable owners and enabling legal package.
- 02 FUND + BEGIN** Establish the first funded baseline; begin warning, shelter and evacuation work now.
- 03 BUILD TRUST** Communicate visibly, involve every community and demonstrate fair, credible delivery.

Authority, investment and public confidence turn shared responsibility into action.

Three phases deliver readiness—and a planned Concept review—by end-2030

PHASE 1	PHASE 2	PHASE 3
Q4 2026–2027	2028–2029	2030
AUTHORISE	BUILD	EVALUATE · ADAPT
Approve owners, baselines, legal authorities, funding and the first assurance cycle.	Put legislation into force; build registration, mapping, shelter, communications and civic systems.	Operate at scale and hold the first national integrated exercise by year-end. Use its evidence in the first full Concept review and a revised TDC—a planned strength, not unfinished work.

AFTER 2030 Readiness is maintained—and modified for newly emerged requirements—through annual assurance, recurring exercises, refresher training and funded remediation.

LITHUANIA

TOTAL DEFENCE MODEL

A RESILIENT NATION. A SAFER EUROPE.



INTERNATIONAL AND ALLIANCE INTEGRATION

A reliable Ally – enabling allied forces to arrive and operate, working with neighbours, and strengthening EU and NATO cooperation.



ARMED DEFENCE AND MOBILISATION

A well-prepared Lithuanian Armed Forces and a nation ready to mobilise people and resources when needed.



GOVERNANCE CONTINUITY

National and municipal authorities can decide, act and keep governing, even if leaders are lost or central systems fail.



INTERNAL SECURITY AND RULE OF LAW

Police, security services, border guards, courts and municipalities can counter hostile acts, maintain public order and uphold the rule of law in all situations.



CIVIL DEFENCE AND POPULATION PROTECTION

People can be warned, sheltered, evacuated if necessary and cared for, while essential services continue to function during a crisis.



ECONOMIC RESILIENCE AND SUPPLY SECURITY

Key infrastructure, essential services, the workers who run them and critical supplies keep working at an agreed minimum level, and damage can be repaired.



SOCIETAL RESILIENCE AND CIVIL RESISTANCE

Citizens, communities, NGOs, employers and civic organisations are prepared, organised and trusted, and can help the country hold out through a long crisis.



INFORMATION RESILIENCE AND PSYCHOLOGICAL DEFENCE

Lithuania can communicate with the public in a way people trust, protect its information space, detect and counter hostile narratives, and maintain confidence and unity.



PEOPLE LAND FREEDOM

